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Chaoming Song,1 Neil Johnson1DA popular stereotype is that women will play more minor roles than men as environments become more dangerous
and aggressive. Our analysis of new longitudinal data sets from offline and online operational networks [for ex-
ample, ISIS (Islamic State)] shows that although men dominate numerically, women emerge with superior
network connectivity that can benefit the underlying system’s robustness and survival. Our observations suggest
new female-centric approaches that could be used to affect such networks. They also raise questions about how
individual contributions in high-pressure systems are evaluated.ow
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 INTRODUCTION
Males are overrepresented within terrorist groups (1). Although exam-
ples of famous and historically important female terrorists exist (2, 3),
there is still a common tendency to assume that women in general will
play more minor, subservient roles than men in terrorist groups that
personify highly dangerous and aggressive environments. Indeed, cur-
rent discourse tends to assume that female ISIS (Islamic State) recruits
are “lured,” whereas males are “recruited” (4). Such assumptions, in-
fluenced by long-standing cultural and societal norms, come at the
expense of attempting to understand terrorist behavior and the imme-
diate operational context in which it plays out. This paper typifies the
latter approach by conducting a series of social network analyses to test
how important women are within such extreme networks despite any
numerical and perceived physical disadvantage.
Using new data sets that we have assembled at the highest available
temporal resolutions, the results indicate that women tend to be key
players in both high-profile online and offline settings. For the online
setting, we analyze individuals on the global social media outlet
VKontakte (www.vk.com) who become linked when they decide to fol-
low the same online pro-ISIS group page (see Materials and Methods).
For the offline setting, we consider time-resolved data (5, 6) concern-
ing the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (5–13) covering
three decades from 1970 to 1998, where individuals become linked
when they decide to collaborate on planning and executing an attack.
Although men dominated numerically in each case, we find that
women emerge with superior network connectivity at the collective
level that is associated with benefits for system robustness and survival
(14, 15). The networks that we analyze were not cherry-picked: In ad-
dition to being the only such operational networks for which detailed
longitudinal information is known concerning the links and nodes
over time, they are also the most successful examples for each genre
(5–13, 16). Moreover, the network links reflect operational behavior
over time, not simple social acquaintance, which means that ourresults are not clouded by potential differences between women and
men in terms of numbers of friends.RESULTS
Online pro-ISIS network
Figure 1 summarizes our findings from analyzing the online network
of ISIS support. To date, ISIS is the most successful example in terms
of attracting attention online; its status as the number one terrorist
organization is arguably based on its online ability to gather support
and spread fear globally (16). Although many millions of online users
may casually mention ISIS activity in passing on social media such as
Twitter and Facebook, for example, following a recent piece of news,
our focus is on the social network of those who share and promote
pro-ISIS operational materials, including videos of beheadings, to make
a meaningful comparison with the operational offline network of
PIRA. Intensive online manual searching in which we trace such nar-
ratives and material (see Materials and Methods) revealed that such
followers congregate around online group pages of non-U.S. Facebook
equivalents, in particular VKontakte. Facebook shuts down such pro-
ISIS activity immediately, whereas these online pages manage to grow
on VKontakte and become disabled only sporadically. Figure 1A illus-
trates daily snapshots of a subset of this pro-ISIS network in which
individuals are shown as connected if they belong to the same online
group page on that given day.
Figure 1B shows the betweenness centrality (BC) for this pro-ISIS
network on a daily basis. Materials and Methods indicates the standard
definition of BC that we use, whereas fig. S1 demonstrates the mean-
ing of BC and its calculation. The average BC for the women con-
sistently peaks much higher than that for the men (red versus blue
spikes in Fig. 1B). Such a high BC can bring global benefits to the
network because the BC of a node measures the fraction of shortest
paths from all nodes to all others that pass through that given node.
Shortest paths between members in covert networks are considered
crucial for passing items between any two nodes, because every extra
step represents extra risk and potential cost (17–20). Hence, the high
average BC for women suggests that women can, on average, play a
more central role in passing items such as recruitment messages, files,
prayers, and video and audio propaganda; brokering distant parts of the1 of 6
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 network (for example, aligning narratives); and channeling funds. This
importance of high BCwas recently noted by Roberts and Everton (18),
who state that intelligence officers in northern Iraq successfully identi-
fied “… actors in an insurgent network who scored high in terms of
betweenness centrality (BC) as information insertion points. The effort
was… successful in rolling up the insurgency.” However, gender-specific
roles were not accounted for in that study.
Degree centrality (see Materials and Methods for definition) shows
strong daily fluctuations as we might expect: Individuals whose degree
centrality becomes high on a given day suddenly have more direct
connections and thus become more noticeable to opposing agencies,
thereby providing an incentive to rectify this in subsequent days. De-
spite this, we find that women also achieve a significantly higher av-
erage degree centrality than men (red versus blue vertical line in Fig.
1C) and that the women’s value is significantly higher than that of a
null model where we randomly shuffle the gender of nodes in the un-
derlying time-averaged network (bell-shaped curves in Fig. 1C). The Z
score of the degree centrality of men is −4.7, whereas that of women is
4.7. On days when women show higher BC than men, women do not
necessarily have a higher degree centrality than men. The net result is
that women effectively avoided being noticeable “stars” (Fig. 1D, left)Manrique et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1501742 10 June 2016while simultaneously providing the global network benefits of high BC
(Fig. 1D, right).
Offline PIRA network
Figure 2 summarizes our findings for PIRA, whose operations were
entirely offline during the active period. Not only did PIRA manage
to survive a remarkably long period opposing a technologically ad-
vanced enemy (UK). It is also regarded as the most successful terror-
ist network in history in terms of innovating and implementing
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (5–13). Starting as an army-like
structure, PIRA effectively reorganized itself over a period of a few years
between the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s, forming a col-
lection of dynamic, self-organized, bottom-up operational units with
significant autonomy (5–13). We constructed time-resolved networks
for each year in the subsequent period from the early 1980s onward,
with a link connecting any two individuals involved in the same IED
event during that year.
Figure 2A illustrates that the evolution of this PIRA network is
accompanied by a marked increase in the number of IED events
over this period (Fig. 2B). This evolution culminated in the 1990’s
peace process. The increase in activity (Fig. 2B) is not accompanied
by an increase in available actors (fig. S2). The number of actors
appears to decrease, thereby contradicting the simplistic argument
that an increase in productivity of such a terrorist organization re-
sults from an increase in its size. Compared to ISIS, the PIRA net-
work is small because of the low number of PIRA actors, which is not
surprising given that PIRA was an on-street operation whose indivi-
duals were targeted by security forces and imprisoned, or killed by
opposing paramilitary groups. Such threats also extended to their fa-
milies and children, strongly motivating PIRA members to remain
“under the radar.” Despite being a small minority in PIRA, the av-
erage BC of women increases over time to values well above those of
men (Fig. 2C), whereas their average degree centrality (Fig. 2D) de-
creases faster than that of men. Although we cannot prove conscious
intent in either case, the fact that the risks of on-street PIRA activity
are much more direct than those of online ISIS activity offers an ex-
planation as to why PIRA womenmight have wanted to reduce their
average degree centrality over time (Fig. 2D), whereas pro-ISIS
women maintained theirs. A full description of PIRA’s network evo-
lution and women’s involvement undoubtedly requires many addi-
tional sociological factors. In Fig. 2E, we momentarily suspend such
concerns, adopting instead one possible implication of women’s high
BC to see what this helps predict about other PIRA network features.
Given that high BC is associated with more shortest paths and hence
better passing of materials and brokerage, we will momentarily as-
sume that individuals with high BC (that is, women) are more in-
clined to act as team players than those with lower BC (that is,
men). We will also assume that women then spread this team ethic
to other individuals in network clusters within which these women
sit (see fig. S3 for details). We set this spreading process running
on the back of a model of fission-fusion dynamics that was proposed,
with empirical support, to describe the internal dynamics in terrorist
organizations (21–24). This simulation of a network is necessary be-
cause we only have PIRA network data on a yearly scale, whereas
such spreading likely happens on the scale of weeks or months. Al-
though obviously massively oversimplified, this setup is at least
consistent with the fact that a team ethic was known to have spread
within PIRA after reorganization. Running this computer simulationFig. 1. Online extreme network under pressure (ISIS). (A) Illustrative,
time-resolved snapshots of a subset of the global online pro-ISIS network
on VKontake.com (www.vk.com). Over a 2-month period in early 2015, we
observed 16,931 females and 24,883 males. (B) Female versus male aver-
age BCs over time. Women show frequent large peaks (red) as compared
to men (blue). (C) Female versus male degree centralities averaged over
time. The women’s value is more than 4 SDs s (that is, Z > 4) larger than
the mean null model result obtained by randomly shuffling node genders,
andmuch larger than themen’s value. The opposite is true for men. (D) Left:
The central node has high BC and high degree centrality. Peripheral nodes
have low values of each. Right: The central node has high BC but low degree
centrality.2 of 6
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 yields results that are indeed close to the empirical data for the PIRA
network evolution (Fig. 2E).
Association with longevity
Online pro-ISIS groups on VKontakte are sporadically shut down by
external agents (25, 26). Onemight ask whether the presence of women
in suchonline groupshas anybearingon that group’s longevity. InFig. 3A,
we observe that the longevity of an online pro-ISIS group does indeed
tend to increase with the fraction of women that are in it. Turning to the
offline PIRA, Fig. 3B draws a related conclusion concerning additional
longevity associated with women: Women’s connections in the PIRA
network have superior longevity to men’s and are also superior to a null
model where we randomly shufflemembers’ gender. Such a result is con-
sistent with women’s tendency to be better embedded in the network.DISCUSSION
In our analysis of these offline and online networks, we observed that
the topological role of women can differ significantly from that of men.
In particular, we observed that the BC of women in both types of
network could reach much higher values than that of men. Although
further studies of other networks are desirable, our findings suggest
that female-centric approaches can be adopted to affect or reengineer
extreme networks, evenwhenwomen are in aminority, by focusing onManrique et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1501742 10 June 2016women’s interconnectivity. By contrast, traditional approaches focus on
targeting individual members (invariably men) who may act as hubs
(highest degree centrality). More generally, our work raises questions
about who the important members are for the development of a network
andwhether the individual contributions of potentially underrepresented
members would be better evaluated in terms of a collective networkmea-
sure (for example, BC) instead of a local one (degree centrality of indi-
vidual stars; that is, hubs) (27). We stress that in no way are we
suggesting any sort of targeting of women with high BC; instead, our
results led us to believe that an effective strategy for reengineering or
affecting a network would be to engage with these women.
One limitation of our study is the fact that despite the closure that
we achieved during data collection, we cannot prove that our networks
are complete. At the very least, however, they are likely representative.
Second, a myriad of external events can help shape network evolution.
However, uncorrelated noise is unlikely to add additional structure to
the network measures upon which we focus (for example, BC). Third,
one might wonder if the emergence of women in such key positions in
these networks is a consequence of their “exceptional” status. For our
ISIS data, the percentage of women followers can reach 50%, ruling out
the argument of rarity as a driver. Moreover, available demographic
information of highly central individual women does not indicate any
features that are statistically different from theirmale counterparts. Fur-
thermore, the frequency distribution of women’s BC has a broad distri-
bution that contradicts the notion of “exceptionality” of a few individualsFig. 2. Offline extreme network under pressure (PIRA). (A) Illustrative, time-resolved snapshots of a subset of the PIRA network following its self-
organized restructuring between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. (B) Starting from the early 1980s, PIRA’s productivity increases in
terms of attacks with IEDs. (C) Similar increase in BC of women over the same period. (D) Degree centrality over the same period. (E) Results of a
generative model (see fig. S3) showing good agreement with the empirical data for the PIRA network, for the fraction of isolated agents (top) and
average number of links per agent (bottom).3 of 6
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 (see fig. S4). For the PIRA case, we were able to test the exceptionality
hypothesis by comparing the actual list of highest-ranked individuals
to lists of candidate womenproduced independently by several subject
matter experts based on the reputation of individual women. There
was no correlation—notably, none of the highest-ranking women were
those whose reputation was deemed highest by the experts. Fourth, one
might wonder whether the central role of women in the PIRA network
is the consequence of themmonopolizing, or being assigned to, certain
operational roles. Because our PIRA data captured demographic and
operational information of every PIRAmember, we were able to inves-
tigate BC as a function of operational role. Figure S5 indicates that there
is no clear evidence of network position being tied to a specific opera-
tional role. Fifth, we have only discussed here two measures of a social
network: BC and degree centrality. However, these measures are stan-
dard ones for social networks (17). Although higher-order measures
(that is, multinode correlation functions) may, in principle, reveal more
detail, themeasures that we calculate and their behaviors are real effects.
Furthermore, one has to be careful with pursuing increasing detail from
such higher-order statistical moments, because they generally require
larger amounts of data to give reliable results and are more prone to
noise. Sixth, it may happen that the women on online platforms that
are dominated by men will naturally attract more attention. However,
Fig. 3A suggests that the increased lifetime of a group is actually asso-
ciated with havingmore women, which, by that argument, wouldmake
the groupmore noticeable, hencemore likely to be shut down, and thus
have a shorter lifetime in contrast to the empirical data in Fig. 3A. Finally,
we note that we have purposely avoided discussing how our findings
might fit into wider debates concerning gender issues in society (28–33)
because the present paper is focused on—and limited to—terrorist
support online and offline. However, we hope that our findingsmight
one day be incorporated into such wider discourse.
Our results do feed into a growing literature on the importance of
centrality in networks that benefits communications, transmission of
items, and brokerage (17–20). In their landmark paper, Everton and
Cunningham (20) specifically chose BC and degree centrality as mea-
sures that are considered important for communication in an extreme
network. Their studies of real covert networks, but in another context
and without focusing on gender as we do, show that “…the network
became increasingly more reliant on a handful of individuals for the
brokerage of information and other resources as time went by.” It is
also known [for example, Kenney et al. (12)] that non-Western covertManrique et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1501742 10 June 2016networks develop flatter structures akin to PIRA; hence, our results are
of more general interest, in particular given that followers of any cur-
rent or future extremist organization are likely to share files containing
propaganda online and hence stand to benefit from high numbers of
pathways and high BC (27). It is already known that this passing of
material is an essential part of ISIS spreading its message quickly to a
broad audience, with audio lectures being circulated by prominent
sheikhs (leaders of a Muslim organization or group, or preachers),
in addition to prayers, ISIS official videos, links to other sites where
the information is shared, and religious books. Such pathways also
serve to channel funds and organize the prayer (“dua”) for the fighters.
Perhaps most importantly, our work feeds into current discussions
about the role of women combatants in conflict and terrorism, and
how this can differ from stereotypes in which women adopt a more
minor role. In particular, Cohen (34) has explored how women in some
African conflicts have been as bloodthirsty or violent as men—and in
some cases even more so. Bloom (2) has shown that women can in-
deed be the source of radicalization in terrorist movements, whereas
Sjoberg and Gentry (35) have shown that militarized women have in-
centives to overcompensate and be more aggressive. Concerning ISIS,
our study focuses on women’s activity in the online world; however, it
would be fascinating to relate this to actual women fighters within ISIS
as studied, for example, by Saltman and Smith (36) and Bloom and
Winter (37, 38). In addition, it would be interesting to quantify how
specific changes in pressure change the centrality of women, and how
women’s participation transfers across generations within a given family.MATERIALS AND METHODS
Experimental design
We collected and analyzed the social network structure in two sets of
longitudinal data with information about gender of participants.
Online pro-ISIS. Our collection of this data set used both manual
and computer-based techniques. We chose VKontakte (www.vk.com)
for our pro-ISIS analysis because (i) pro-ISIS group pages are shut
down essentially immediately on Facebook, but not on VKontakte;
(ii) it allows multiple languages and is used worldwide; (iii) it is the
largest European online social networking service with more than 360
million users; (iv) it has been used by ISIS to spread propaganda within
the Russian-speaking population (27); and (v) being based in Russia,Fig. 3. Lifetime of groups and neighbors in the network. (A) For a larger ratio of women to men in a pro-ISIS online group, we observe, on average, an
increase in the group’s lifetime (Pearson’s r = 0.28, P < 0.1). (B) We observe that PIRA actors directly connected to women have a longer average lifetime as
compared to actors directly connected to men. Larger values for women are statistically significant as compared to a null model that randomly shuffles
the gender of PIRA members.4 of 6
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 it has a high concentration of users of Chechen origin focused in the
Caucasus region near ISIS’s main area of influence in the Levant.
Our methodology for identifying the online pro-ISIS social network
was as follows: (Step 1)Wemanually identified relevant narratives using
hashtags across multiple languages, for example, #игиш (that is, ISIS),
#дауля (that is, dawla, meaning “state”), #халифат (that is, “caliphate”),
and #isn #khilafah #fisyria, and traced these to underlying group pages,
for example, fi sabilillah_x. Relevant group pages were selected on the
basis of the observation that they explicitly expressed support for ISIS
by publishing ISIS-related news/propaganda and/or their messages
contained called for jihad in Syria (Sham). (Step 2) This list was fed into
the Application Programming Interfaces software that expanded it
using automated search snowballing. (Step 3) The expanded aggregate
list was cross-checked to eliminate false identifications. (Step 4) New
embedded linkswere manually searched to identify more group pages
and hashtags. (Step 5) We then iterated this process until closure when
no new group pages could be found. Although the process was labor-
intensive, we were able to find closure on a daily basis in real time. The
individual members (followers) of these group pages were then ex-
tracted, with these becoming nodes in the social network that we ana-
lyze in this paper. On any given day, a link was added between any
two individuals who were following the same group page on that day.
In this way, we obtained a social network of individuals for each day.
The nodes in this network changed in number and identity over time,
with some persisting more than others, whereas the links also changed
in total number and location in the network. The total number of indi-
viduals obtainedwithin the two typical months used for the study (early
2015) was 41,880, comprising 24,883 men, 16,931 women, and 66 with
no declared gender. The number of groupswas 170. Themean number
of followers per groupwas 624, with amaximumof 8155. The resulting
social network had more than a million aggregated links. These results
were reproduced for other choices of months during January to May
2015, which is a period during which pro-ISIS support had significant
Web presence on VKontakte.
Offline PIRA. This data set, which is widely regarded as the most
complete data set of a terrorist organization currently in existence,
emerged as part of a 30-month project carried out by researchers at
Pennsylvania State University, along with partners at the State Univer-
sity of New York in Albany (5, 6), and included the direct involvement
of several co-authors on this paper. It started as a pilot project, in
which members of the team built a manual social network by collect-
ing all PIRA members named in the book Bandit Country (8), which
provides an essentially complete history of the South Armagh Brigade.
Following the network ties mentioned there, more individuals were
added to the PIRA network, and each individual was characterized
with available demographic information. As an expansive step, sifting
through all key seminal texts and PIRA statements then produced
additional names. After adding their demographic information, more
individuals were added through their mentioned ties until a point of
self-consistency, and hence closure, was reached. PIRA time-resolved
events (5461) involving IEDs were collected, as well as all fatal PIRA
shootings. Different IED types were accounted for, for example, letter
bombs, pipe bombs, grenades, homemade bombs, static munitions,
buried IEDs, undervehicle IEDs, car bombs, mortars, and rockets. Then,
the number of complex IED events was tallied, with each such event
defined as occasions where an IED was used in conjunction with other
types of violent events such as machine gun or sniper fire. Although
information about the type of IED event was not specifically used inManrique et al. Sci. Adv. 2016; 2 : e1501742 10 June 2016this paper, this high resolution helped ensure that events were not
missed or double-counted. The data were collected through a mixture
of LexisNexis and Irish Times archival stories. Involved individuals
could be cross-checked from a number of open sources, such as (i)
statements by PIRA including their annual Roll of Honor, (ii) the
Belfast Graves publication that offers an account of Republicans killed
in combat, (iii) the McKittrick et al. study (10), and (iv) historical ac-
counts of PIRA from academic sources. Names that were involved
in such violent acts were subsequently coded for across a number of
sociodemographic, operational, and network variables using the Irish
Times archives. Each piece of data (IED event and PIRA militant) was
coded twice by separate coders and cross-checked for validity. Similar
to many quantitative studies of terrorism and political violence, a num-
ber of data constraints exist in this study. However, after an 18-month
data collection effort across multiple data sources, this data set is wide-
ly considered the best data available. To construct time-resolved net-
works, we then used these data to create a link between any two actors
when they collaborated on the development of an IED and/or planned
or executed an assault during a given time period (for example, year).
In total, 926 different individuals emerged over time, of whom approx-
imately 5% were women. There was significant turnover in membership
of the resulting IED network on a yearly basis, in part due to deaths
or imprisonments, but on average, there were 135 men and 6 women
per year from 1970 to 1998. Their roles are scattered across the category
types, as explained in the references concerning these data and their
analysis that we provide in the main paper. The total number of re-
gistered members of PIRA was 1382, with 1312 men and 70 women.
An in-depth discussion of women of PIRA in this time frame is provided
in Bloom’s work (2, 3) as well as in the work of other researchers (5–13).
Statistical analysis
The definition of BC of a node n in a network with a given total
number of nodes is given by
cB nð Þ ¼ ∑s≠t≠n sstðnÞsst ð1Þ
where sst is the number of shortest paths between nodes s and t,
whereas sst (n) is the number of these shortest paths that run through
node n. Because the total number of nodes in the connected network
changes considerably over time, andwewere interested inmeasuring how
BC changes over time, we normalized this quantity in the standard way
cBðnÞ ¼ cBðnÞðN  1ÞðN  2Þ ð2Þ
where N is the number of nodes in the connected network at any par-
ticular time step [the so-called giant component (17)]. Our null model
results throughout the paper were obtained by randomly shuffling
node genders and then repeating the calculations. We note that al-
though some online individuals might declare incorrect genders, there
is no clear incentive to do so because there is no need for individuals to
explicitly declare any gender at all. Hence, we expect that this effect does
not significantly alter our main conclusions. Indeed, one could argue
that incorrect declarations of gender might a priori come from men
and women in roughly similar proportions. In support of this, we note
that undeclared individuals make up ~0.15% of all users and the degree5 of 6
R E S EARCH ART I C L Ecentrality of these undeclared individuals is statistically indistinguisha-
ble from the null model results (Z = −0.3) in Fig. 1C. This implies that
the subset of undeclared individuals has a similar statistics to a ran-
domized version of the entire set of online pro-ISIS individuals in
which the gender of nodes has been shuffled. This suggests that the
decision to not declare genders is not strongly gender-specific. Given
this, we suspect that the decision to declare the opposite gender is also
not strongly gender-specific and instead acts as a noise term that should
not affect our main results.D
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